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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT W. BARNES, JR., DAVID C.
BARNES, SUSAN B. NIELSON, dba
THE BARNES FAMILY PARTNERSHIP,
Plaintiffs and
Respondents.

RESPONDENTS' REPLY BRIEF

vs.
RICHARD C. WOOD and MARILYN P.
WOOD, dba FERNWOOD CANDY &
ICE CREAM COMPANY, a
partnership,

Case No. 20424

Defendants and
Appellants.

I.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

The following issues are presented for review on this
Appeal:
1.

Was there substantial evidence to support the trial

court's finding that the modification agreement entered into
by the parties reducing the rent under the Lease did not
abrogate the escalation clause contained in paragraph 3 of the
Lease, and that the reduced rental amount remained subject to
future escalations?
2.

Was there substantial evidence to support the trial

court's finding that the mere fact that the lessee paid for a
period of time less than the full amount of rent which the
lessee was obligated to pay did not bar the lessor from
recovering the full amount of rent owed?

3.

Was there substantial evidence to support the trial

court's finding that the lessee agreed

to and acquiesced in

the use by the lessor of the "Consumer Price Index - All Urban
Consumers" to calculate escalations in rent and that such
index reasonably comported with the intention of the parties
when they entered into the Lease?
4.

Was there substantial evidence to support the trial

court's finding that the lessee is liable for arrearages in
property tax payments when the Lease provided that such
payments would be due from the lessee "upon proof of payment
of the same" where the lessee never requested proof of
payment, never objected to paying on the basis that proof of
payment had not been received, and where the lessor proved at
trial that the taxes had been paid?
5.

Was there substantial evidence to support the trial

court's award of attorneys' fees based upon the evidence
presented by the lessor's counsel as to the amount of fees
charged, the nature of the services performed and the time
spent, and where the parties stipulated that attorneys' fees
could be determined upon affidavits?
II.

NATURE OF THE CASE

This action was brought by Respondents Robert W.
Barnes, Jr., David C. Barnes and Susan B. Nielson, doing
business as The Barnes Family Partnership (hereinafter
referred to as the "Barnes Children"), to recover arrearages
in rent owed by Appellants Richard C. Wood and Marilyn P.

Wood, doing business as Fernwood Candy & Jce Cream Co.
(hereinafter referred to as "Wood"), pursuant to a Lease
Agreement dated September 1, 1976 between Jacqueline Barnes
(hereinafter referred to as "Mrs. Barnes"), the mother of the
Barnes Children, and Wood.

Wood counterclaimed for attorneys1

fees on the basis that the filing of the action constituted a
breach of the Lease Agreement.
III.

DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT

The case was tried to the Court on August 14, 15 and
16, 1984. The trial court thereafter entered Judgment in
favor of the Barnes Children for the back rent claimed to be
owed, for the increase in property taxes owed and for costs
and attorneys1 fees.
IV.
A.

STATEMENT OF FACtS

Facts.

On or about September 1, 1976, Mrs. Barnes leased
certain property located at 3364 South 2300 East, Salt Lake
City, Utah, commonly known as the Palace Ice Cream Store, to
Wood for a period of ten years commencing September 1, 1976.
Pursuant to the paragraph 3 of the Lease, the initial
monthly rent was $750.00. However, the parties also agreed to
the following escalation provision:
"[T]he monthly rental shall be adjusted upward
or downward based upon the United States Cost of
Living Index, using August 1976 as a base, provided

that the index must rise or fall 5% from the base
or prior adjusted level before adjustments in the
rent are made." [Ex. 1]
Paragraph 4 of the Lease required Wood to pay 75% of
any increase in property taxes in excess of 5% of the 1976
taxes. [Ex. 1]
Pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 10 of the
Lease, Mrs. Barnes subleased to Wood her leasehold interest in
a parking lot adjacent to the leased premises. Wood agreed to
pay 75% of the parking lot rental.

Paragraph 3 of the parking

lot lease contained the same rental escalation provision that
was contained in the premises lease based upon "the United
States Government Cost of Living Index." [Ex. 3]
The provisions of the Lease requiring Wood to pay 75%
of the increase in property taxes and 75% of the parking lot
rental were based upon the fact that Wood was using 75% of the
property. [R. 340, 343 & 514]
On or about September 6, 1979, Raymond A. Hintze
("Hintze"), attorney for Mrs. Barnes, sent a letter to Wood
notifying Wood that pursuant to paragraph 3 of the Lease, the
base rent of $750.00 per month was being increased effective
September 1, 1979 to $960.00 per month based upon cost of
living figures obtained from the United States Government.
Hintze also informed Wood that the parking lot lease had
increased to $200.00 per month and, mistakenly, that Woodfs
share of the lease payment on the parking lot would thereafter
be $100.00, for a total rental payment of $1,060.00 per
month.

Wood knew that the Lease obligated Wood to pay 75% of

the parking lot lease or $150 and that it looked like Hintze
made an error, but did not inform Hintze bf the error. [R.
516]

In his letter, Hintze also notified Wood that $118.81

was due under the Lease for Wood's 75% share of the increased
property taxes. [Ex. 7]

The index used by Hintze to determine

escalations in the rent based upon increases in the cost of
living was the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers
("CPI-U"), prepared by the Bureau of Laboif Statistics, United
States Department of Labor. [R. 508; Ex.

tl]

Neither Wood nor Wood's attorney objected that the
escalations requested by Hintze had not b^en properly
determined under the Lease or that the index utilized by
Hintze to determine those escalations was improper. [R. 514,
550]

In this regard, at the time the Lease was executed, Wood

assumed that the escalation clause would be governed by a cost
of living index covering all items and applicable to the
United States as a whole and not by some sub-index, such as an
index for a region of the United States. Wood didn't even
know sub-indexes existed. [R. 520 & 522]

In fact, in

September 1979, Wood began paying the increased rent of $1,060
per month as demanded by Hintze. [R. 586]
Although Wood began paying the increased rent, on or
about December 5, 1979, Gaylen S. Young, Jr. ("Young"),
attorney for Wood, sent a letter to Hintze seeking to
negotiate a reduction in the rent. [Ex. 8]

Young claimed in

that letter that it was impossible for Wood to continue on

with the Lease unless the rent was renegotiated and that Wood
was "losing several thousand dollars a year" on the Palace
store.

Shortly after the Young letter was sent, Wood called

Hintze and told him the escalations may force Wood into
bankruptcy. [R. 356]

In fact, these claims were false.

Wood

was not losing "several" thousand dollars a year on the store
and the small losses actually realized were artificially
caused by the fact that Wood substantially marked-up the price
of ice cream which he sold to himself and arbitrarily
allocated to the store substantial overhead expenses incurred
by the manufacturing arm of Wood's business. [R. 575-576, 642,
658, 661]

In any event, Young proposed in his letter the

following reduction in rent:
"Fernwoods would like to work out some fair
negotiation in regard to this Lease with your
client that would be fair. Perhaps a $900 per
month base could be suggested, plus all increases
in property taxes over the 1979 base." [Emphasis
added] [Ex. 8]
Young testified at trial that he didn't know why he used the
word "base" in his December 5, 1979 letter but that he
understood the term "base" to mean whatever Richard Wood
understood that term to mean. [R. 554-556]

Wood understood

the term "base" rent to mean the rent from which escalations
are calculated. [R. 615, 616]

That is the normal usage of the

term "base" with respect to leases and is what Hintze
understood Young's use of the term "base" to mean. [R.
357-359, 389-390]

While discussions between the parties on a reduction in
rent were pending, and in January 1980, Mrs. Barnes was
murdered by a burglar who had broken into her home.

Ferris

Collett was appointed Personal Representative of her Estate
and Hintze acted as attorney for the Estate. [R. 347, 392]
Shortly after Mrs. Barnes1 death and on or about
January 23, 1980, Hintze sent a letter to Young agreeing to
reduce the rent to $1,000 per month ($900.00 base rent for the
building and $100.00 for the parking lot). [Ex. 9]

Hintze

only intended this to be a reduction of the base rent from
which future excalations would be calculated and there was
never any discussion or agreement between the parties that the
escalation clause of the Lease would be eliminated or that
there would be no future escalations in the rent. [R. 364,
371, 388, 390, 392, 558 & 563]

In fact, Young understood that

Wood would remain responsible for future increases in property
taxes. [R. 567]
Although Wood never formally accepted the offer
contained in Hintze's January 23, 1980 to reduce the rent,
Wood did start paying $1,000 per month rent in February 1980
and continued making that payment. [R. 397, 598]
In the Summer of 1979, prior to Hintze's September 6,
1979 letter demanding an increase in rent, the parking lot
lease had expired and in September 1979, Mrs. Barnes
negotiated a new lease agreement on the parking lot. [R. 344]
On February 14, 1980, under the guise that (Wood had only
recently been informed of the expiration of the parking lot

lease, Wood attempted to obtain a further reduction in the
rent by claiming that the expiration of the original parking
lot lease constituted a default by Mrs. Barnes under the lease
agreement. [Exs. 10 & 12; R. 599]

In fact, Wood knew all

about the expiration of the parking lot lease and the
execution of the new parking lot lease back in the Fall of
1979 when the rental reduction to $1,000 a month was being
negotiated. [-R. 586-87, 611-613]

Hintze refused Wood's

transparent attempt to renegotiate a 'better deal. [Exs. 11 &
13]
Mrs. Barnes1 Will gave the Palace Ice Cream Store
property to her children, and in January 1981, the Barnes
Children received a Personal Representative's Deed to the
property from Ferris Collett. [R. 347-348, 421-22]

Prior to

the Summer of 1982, the Barnes Children did not read the Lease
and had no knowledge of the provisions of the Lease providing
for escalations in the base rent based upon increases in the
cost of living index. [R. 406, 422, 422A]

The Barnes Children

had no reason to read the Lease prior to the Summer of 1982
because they did not know there was a problem with the Lease.
[R. 426]
In the Summer of 1982, the Barnes Children learned for
the first time from their father, Warren Barnes, that there
was an apparent shortfall in the rent that was being paid
under the Lease. [R. 406, 422]

Accordingly, on or about

October 12, 1982, the Barnes Children sent a letter to Wood
demanding the back rental payments and property tax payments

due pursuant to the provisions of the Lea£e.

[Ex, 14]

Wood

rejected the demand for back rental payments and property tax
payments and refused to increase the monthly rental payments
above $1,000 per month.

Wood did not refuse to make the back

rental payments on the basis that the wrong escalation index
had been used nor did Wood request proof of payment of the
property taxes or refuse to pay property taxes on the basis
that no proof of payment had been provided. [R. 619]

The

Barnes Children then commenced this action seeking to recover
the back rental payments and property tax^s due.
B.

The Proceedings Below.

The Barnes Children sought recoveryf below for the back
payments due under the Lease and for Wood's fraud in
misrepresenting the financial condition of his business in
order to obtain the rent reduction back in 1980. [R. 134-148]
Wood filed a Counterclaim seeking attorneys' fees on the basis
that the Barnes Children had breached the modified Lease by
commencing this action. [R. 15-20]

The case went to trial

before the Court on August 14, 15 and 16, 1984. Thereafter,
and on or about August 30, 1984, the Court entered a Minute

At the time this letter was sent, thfe Barnes Children
had no knowledge of the rent reduction agreement
between Hintze and Wood and did not fearn of that
agreement until after the filing of this lawsuit. [R.
401, 406, 422, 426 & 427] The Barne$ Children further
did not have any knowledge of the parking lot rent
splitting arrangement prior to the filing of this
lawsuit. [R. 420, 422A; Ex. 14]

Order ruling in favor of Plaintiffs on all claims except the
fraud claim. [R. 227]
Paragraph 14 of the Lease Agreement provided that in
the event of default under the Lease, the defaulting party
would pay all costs and expenses, including reasonable
attorneys1 fees incurred in enforcing the Lease.

The parties

stipulated below that the prevailing party could prove its
attorneys1 fees by affidavit.

Counsel for the Barnes Children

presented evidence by affidavit as to the nature of the
services performed and number of hours spent on the case, that
the total attorneys1 fees incurred in this action were $9,850,
that those fees were billed at a rate approximately 20% below
counsel1s then current billing rate and that virtually no
additional time, effort or expense was incurred in presenting
the fraud claim (with respect to which attorneys' fees were
not recoverable) because the same witnesses, documents,
testimony and arguments would have been presented with or
without the fraud claim. [R. 256-257, 277-283]
Wood objected to the amount of attorneys1 fees and
costs claimed by the Barnes Children. [R. 270]

After a

hearing in October 1984, the Court ruled that the unsuccessful
prosecution of the fraud claim reasonably involved one-third
of the attorneys1 fees claimed by the Barnes Children and
therefore reduced the attorneys1 fees claimed by one-third.
[R. 285] Thereafter, on November 6, 1984, Judgment was entered
in favor of the Barnes Children in the following amounts:
$13,072.77 for back rental on the premises Lease; $4,718.82

for back rental on the parking lot lease; $1,081.05 for
property taxes; attorneys1 fees of $6,566.66; and costs of
$476.34. [R. 286-288]
V.
1.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

The trial court correctly determined that the

modification agreement entered into by the parties in January
1980, did not abrogate the escalation provisions of the Lease
and that the reduced rent provided for by the modification
agreement remained subject to future escalations because of
cost of living increases.

In the negotiations between the

parties, it is clear that the only matter ever discussed was a
reduction in the "base" rent from which future escalations
would be calculated and that there was never any discussion
whatsoever between the parties that the escalation clause
would not remain in effect or that there would be a fixed
rental amount for the remainder of the lease term.

Any

agreement to modify the Lease would have had to be in writing
under the Statute of Frauds.
2.

The fact that the Barnes Children received

$1,000.00 a month from Wood, constituting only a portion of
the full rent due, until the Fall of 1982, did not bar the
Barnes Children, as a matter of law, from collecting
arrearages in rent.

The issues of whether the Barnes Children

were barred by waiver or estoppel from collecting the full
amount of rent due were questions of fact for the trial court
to resolve.

The trial court resolved these issues in favor of

the Barnes Children based upon substantial evidence.

The

Barnes Children did not intentionally and knowingly give up
their right to collect the full amount of rent due. Wood was
not damaged by any delay by the Barnes Children in attempting
to collect the arrearages in rent.
3.

The trial court properly determined based upon

substantial evidence that the Barnes Children were entitled to
recover escalations in the rent based upon the CPI-U index
because Wood agreed and acquiesced in the use of that index
and that index fairly comported with the intention of the
parties in entering into the Lease.

Wood gave up any right to

complain about the use of this index when back in 1980 he
entered into the modification agreement for a reduction of
rent in settlement of a dispute between the parties after Mrs.
Barnes had already demanded an increase in rent based upon
that index.
4.

The trial court correctly determined based upon

substantial evidence that the Barnes Children were not barred
from recovering the increases in property taxes simply because
prior to trial they had not presented proof to Wood of payment
of the taxes.

Wood never requested proof of payment of the

taxes and never refused to pay his share of the taxes on the
basis that proof had not been given to him.

Rather, Wood

always refused to pay the taxes based upon his contention that
he was only obligated to pay a fixed rent for the remainder of
the term.

The Barnes Children undeniably proved at trial that

they had paid the taxes so that in any event Wood was
obligated to pay the taxes at that time.

5.

The trial court's award of attorneys1 fees to the

Barnes Children was proper.

Counsel for the Barnes Children

presented evidence as to the total fees incurred, the nature
of the services performed and the total number of hours
involved.

Counsel also presented evidence that no additional

time was spent in pursuing the unsuccessful fraud claim for
which attorneys1 fees could not be recovered.

The fact that

the trial court disagreed with counsel's testimony that no
additional time was spent in connection with the fraud claim
and reduced the attorneys' fees sought by one-third based upon
the trial court's own review of the evidence and knowledge of
the case does not make the trial court's decision erroneous.
The trial court was not limited to totally adopting or totally
rejecting the evidence presented by the Barnes Children on
attorneys' fees.
VI.
A.

ARGUMENT

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THE

MODIFICATION TO PARAGRAPH 3 OF THE LEASE AGREEMENT DID NOT
ABROGATE THE ESCALATION PROVISION.
Wood argues that the trial court erred in determining
that the modification agreement entered into by the parties in
January 1980 did not abrogate the escalation provision of the
Lease, and that, as a matter of law, the trial court could
only have found that the parties agreed that the rent would be
fixed at $1,000.00 for the remainder of the Lease term.

This

argument is clearly without merit as there was more than
substantial evidence to support the trial court's
determination.
In this regard, the trial court made the factual
determination that:
"No agreement was requested or made concerning
the escalation provisions of the lease and the
$900.00 amount remains subject to the escalation
provisions of the lease." [Amended Findings of Fact
No. 16, R. 292]
Wood simply seeks to overturn this factual determination by
focusing on his version of the facts and largely ignoring the
evidence supporting the trial court's decision.
When Hintze notified Wood of the rent increase by
letter dated September 6, 1979, Hintze specifically stated
that applying the cost of living increases that had occurred,
"the base rent for the Palace, effective September 1, 1979, is
$960.00."

[emphasis added] [Ex. 7]. In reply to that letter,

Young sent a letter to Hintze dated December 5, 1979 [Ex. 8 ] .
In that letter, Young did not request, or make any mention of,
a fixed rental rate for the remainder of the term of the
Lease.

Rather, Young stated that "[p]erhaps a $900.00 per

month base could be suggested. . . ." [Emphasis added]

Thus,

there is no doubt that in the negotiations the parties were
negotiating what the "base" rent would be, not a fixed rent
for the remainder of the lease term.

Wood understood the term

"base" rent meant the rent from which future escalations are
calculated.

Wood tries to take Hintze's January 23, 1980 letter, in
which he offers to reduce the rent to $1,000.00 per month
(including the parking), out of context by arguing that the
letter does not specify that the $1,000.00 per month rent
would only apply for one year rather than for the remainder of
the term.

It is true that Hintze's letter did not indicate,

one way or the other, the period for which the $1,000 amount
would apply.

Taken in context, however, it is clear, as found

by the trial court, that the $1,000.00 per month offer simply
represented a compromise between the initial demand made by
Mrs. Barnes for a base rent of $960.00 plus $100.00 for the
parking, for a total rental of $1,060.00, and the
counter-offer made by Young of a $900.00 base rent. The
evidence was overwhelming that there was never any discussion
whatsoever between the parties that the escalation clause of
the Lease would be abrogated, or that there would be a fixed
rental for the remainder of term.

Furthermore, any agreement

to modify the Lease by deleting the escalation provision would
have had to be in writing under the Statute of Frauds.

Utah

Code Ann., Section 25-5-3; Zions Properties, Inc. v. Holt, 538
P.2d 1319 (Utah 1975).

No such writing ever existed.

In short, the determination of what the terms of the
modification agreement between the parties were was a question
of fact for the trial court to resolve.

Wood is now simply

rearguing the evidence which the trial court rejected.
is precluded from doing so.

Wood

B.

THE ACCEPTANCE OF RENT DID NOT BAR THE PARTNERSHIP

FROM COLLECTING ARREARAGES IN RENT.
Wood's argument that the Barnes Children's action for
arrearages in rent is barred under the doctrines of equitable
estoppel and waiver is without merit.
Wood is again simply trying to overturn factual
determinations made by the trial court.

The trial court

specifically found that Wood agreed that the reduction in rent
to $1,000.00 per month was for a period of one year only,- that
the escalation provision of the Lease remained binding upon
Wood and that the Barnes Children had not waived their right
to collect the rent.

It is well settled that both equitable

estoppel and waiver are issues for the trier of fact.

Mehl v.

People Ex Rel. Dept. of Public Works, 532 P.2d 489 (Cal.
1975); Redman v. Walters, 152 Cal.Rptr. 42 (1979); Chavez v.
Gomez, 423 P.2d 31 (N.M. 1967).

The trial court heard and

considered the evidence presented by Wood in support of the
estoppel and waiver claims and chose to believe the Barnes
Childrens' evidence.

The trial court's determination is fully

supported by the evidence.
Numerous cases have recognized that the mere acceptance
by a landlord of less than the full amount of rent owed by a
tenant does not bar the landlord from bringing an action for
arrearages in rent.

See, e.g., Green v. Millman Brothers,

Inc., 151 N.W.2d 860 (Mich. 1967); Tower v. Moskowitz, 262
S.2d 276 (Fla. 1972); Steinman v. La Charty Hotel Co., 50 A.2d

297 (Pa. 1947); Corthouts v. Connecticut Fire Safety Services
Corp., 193 A.2d 909 (Conn. 1963); Cottage Associates v. The
Division of Housing and Community Renewal, 387 N.Y.S.2d 18
(1976); Walker v. Associated Dry Goods Corporation, 189 A.2d
91 (Md. 1963).
Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known
right.

Panorama Res. Protective Ass'n. v^ Panorama Corp., 627

P.2d 121 (Wash. 1981); Bowman v. Webster, 269 P.2d 960 (Wash.
1954); Chavez v. Gomez, supra.

The evidence was more than

sufficient to support the trial court's determination that a
waiver had not occurred.

The Barnes Children had no knowledge

of the escalation clause in the contract, or that the full
amount of rent called for by the contract was not being paid
until the summer of 1982, at which time, they acted promptly
and diligently in making demand for the full rental payments.
It is certainly understandable that the Barnes Children would
not gain knowledge of these facts until the Summer of 1982, in
view of the tragic murder of their mother in 1981 and the
circumstances under which the Lease was conveyed to them.
Nor did Wood present any evidence sufficient to give
rise to estoppel.

In this regard, Wood totally failed to

present any evidence that the failure of the Barnes Children
to insist upon the full amount of rent until 1982 caused Wood
any damage.

Wood's only claim of damage is that if the Barnes

Children are not estopped, Wood will be damaged by having to
pay the back rent and taxes.

Those sums dq not constitute

damage to Wood as they are precisely the amounts which the
trial court found Wood had agreed to pay under the Lease.

In

this regard, Wood presented absolutely no evidence that during
the period of time Wood supposedly remained in possession of
the premises in reliance upon the claimed reduced rental
agreement that Wood's business lost money rather than enjoying
a profit.

The trial court expressly found that Wood was not

prejudiced by any delay by the Barnes Children in demanding
payment of the back rent and taxes. [R. 292, Finding of Fact
No. 20]
The only cases cited by Wood in support of Wood's
estoppel argument which involved a landlord-tenant situation
are clearly distinguishable from the case at bar.

In all

those cases, (Wood's Brief, pages 35-36), the trial court had
found that an oral agreement reducing the rent had, in fact,
been entered into, and simply held that under the particular
circumstances there present, the landlord was bound by the
oral rent reduction agreement.

In the present case, the trial

court found that there was rio rent reduction agreement, except
for the one year period.
In summary, the issues of waiver and estoppel clearly
presented issues of fact for the trial court to resolve.

The

trial court, based upon substantial evidence, determined these
factual issues adversely to Wood, and there is no basis for
challenging the trial court's determination.

C.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INTERPRETED THE PROVISIONS

OF PARAGRAPH 3 OF THE LEASE.
Wood's argument that the trial court erred in ruling
that the Barnes Children are entitled to escalations in the
rent based upon the CPI-U when the Lease provided that
escalations would be based upon the "United States Cost of
Living Index" is erroneous.
In the first place/ it is uncontested that in the Fall
of 1979 when Mrs. Barnes increased the rent based upon the
increase in the CPI-U that a dispute arose between the parties
as to whether Wood had to pay the increased rent. Wood
actually threatened to file a lawsuit to obtain a
determination that he didn't have to pay the increased rent
demanded by Mrs. Barnes. [Ex. 8]

The dispute was settled by

the parties' entering into a modification agreement in January
1980 whereby the amount of the rent was reduced subject to
future escalations.

Wood is bound by that settlement which

the trial court found obligated him to pay future escalations
and Wood cannot now for the first time object that the wrong
index was used by Mrs. Barnes in calculating the rent increase
in 1979.
Second, Wood acquiesced in the escalation calculations
made by Hintze based upon the CPI-U and actually paid the
increased rent calculated pursuant to that index from
September 1979 through January 1980 when the modification
agreement was entered into by the parties.

Furthermore, the

separate parking lot lease also provided for escalations based
upon the "United States Government Cost of Living Index".
Wood paid the escalations calculated under that Lease without
objection.

In Johnston v. First National Bank and Trust Co.

624 S.W.2d 500 (Mo. 1981), a case cited by Wood, the Court
held that although the escalation clause in the contract was
too indefinite to be enforced, nevertheless, the one plaintiff
who paid the rent increases demanded by the landlord could not
complain that the escalation clause in the contract was too
indefinite to be enforced.
Finally, contrary to Wood's assertion, the relevant
language of paragraph 3 of the Lease contained a latent
ambiguity as to whether the parties were referring to an index
entitled specifically "United States Cost of Living Index" or
simply to an index covering the United States as a whole and
not excluding any items because no index entitled "United
States Cost of Living Index" existed.

Extrinsic evidence is

always admissible to interpret a latent ambiquity and the
intent and meaning of the parties is a question of fact for
the trier of fact.

Ford v. Ward, 130 So.2d 380 (Ala. 1961);

Hamada v. Valley Nat'l. Bank, 555 P.2d 1121 (Ariz. 1976);
McCarty v. Mercury Metalcraft Co., 127 N.W.2d 340 (Mich. 1964)
cert, denied, 380 U.S. 952 (1965); Koplin v. Franklin Ins. Co.
of Philadelphia, 44 A.2d 877 (Pa. 1945); Barco Urban Renewal
Corp. v. Housing Auth., 674 F.2d 1001 (3rd Cir. 1982).

The

trial court simply interpreted this ambiguous provision and

determined that the CPI-U index which covered the whole United
States clearly comported with the intent and meaning of the
parties. [R. 290-291, Finding of Fact No. 7]

The evidence

fully supported this finding.
Wood testified that he assumed at the time he signed
the Lease that an index existed covering the entire United
States and not excluding any items or covering any sub regions
[R. 522]. The CPI-U comports in all respects with the index
Wood thought was described in the Agreement and intended would
apply* [R. 290, Finding of Fact No. 2]

The fact that the

Lease did not recite the precise name of the index and
contained the language "Cost of Living Index" instead
"Consumer Price Index" is not determinative.

See, Panorama

Residential Protective Association v. Panorama Corporation,
supra.
The cases cited by Wood which held that the references
to indexes in escalation clauses of leases were too indefinite
to enforce (Wood's Brief, pages 42 and 44) are distinguishable
from the case at bar.
In Seattle First National Bank v. Earl, 565 P.2d 1215
(Wash. 1977), the escalation clause provided that the lease
payments would be increased based upon the "Cost of Living
figures for the City of Spokane".
of living figures for Spokane.

There simply were no cost

In the present case, there

are, in fact, cost of living figures for the entire United
States, which are the figures utilized by Mrs. Barnes and

later the Barnes Children to calculate the rent increases.
Further, the terminology utilized in the lease in the Seattle
First National Bank case was not ambiguous because the
language referred specifically to cost of living figures "for
the City of Spokane".

In the present case, there is an

ambiquity as to whether the parties were referring to an index
specifically entitled "United States Cost of Living Index" or
simply to an index covering the United States as a whole.
In Johnston v. First National Bank and Trust Co.,
supra., cited by Wood, the court noted that there was no
evidence in the record to show what the parties actually
intended, or to furnish some basis for determining by
implication or construction what the parties would be deemed
to have intended as reasonable persons acting in good faith.
Thus, the court held it could not determine which index was to
be utilized.
presented.

In the present case, such evidence was

Wood, himself, testified that he assumed an index

would be utilized which comports precisely with the index
actually utilized.

Further, as previously noted, the Court in

Johnston held that the plaintiff who had actually paid the
increased rent was bound by the index utilized by the landlord.
In executing the Lease, Wood agreed and intended to pay
increases in rent in accordance with increases in the cost of
living in the United States as a whole.
simply held Wood to that bargain.

The trial court

D.

THE BARNES CHILDREN WERE ENTITLED TO AN AWARD FOR

INCREASES IN PROPERTY TAXES.
Wood, in an overly technical and unwarranted reading of
the Lease, argues that the trial court erred in awarding the
Barnes Children increases in property taxes paid on the basis
that the Lease provides that those increased taxes would be
due from Wood "upon proof of payment of the same11 and that
prior to trial the Barnes Children did not tender any proof of
payment to Wood.

This argument is frivolous.

First, Wood never refused to pay the taxes on the basis
that he had not been provided with proof of payment.

In fact,

Wood never even requested proof that the taxes had been paid.
[R. 619]

Rather, Wood always refused to pay the taxes on the

basis of his claim that he was only obligated to pay $1,000
fixed rent for the rest of the term.

Having never objected to

payment of the increased taxes on the basis that proof of
payment had not been given, Wood cannot now complain.
Further, the Barnes Children undeniably proved at trial that
the taxes had been paid. [R. 348-352; Ex. 6]

Conseqently, any

requirement of proof has been satisfied.
Second, Wood's argument is premised on the contention
that proof of payment of the taxes was a condition precedent
to the obligation to pay.

However, courts do not favor

conditions and wherever possible will construe a provision of
a contract as a covenant rather than as a condition.

For

example, in Hohenberg Bros, Co, v, George E. Gibbons & Co,,
537 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Tex. 1976), the Court observed:
"However, where the intent of the parties is
doubtful or where a condition would impose an
absurd or impossible result then the agreement will
be interpreted as creating a covenant rather than a
condition, [citations omitted] This Court has on
numerous occasions discussed the nature of
conditions and covenants and as a general rule has
noted that, 'because of their harshness in
operation, conditions are not favorites of the
law.'"
Treating the language of the present Lease as a covenant that
the Barnes Children would prove to Wood that the Barnes
Children had paid the taxes, Wood is clearly liable for the
payment of the increased taxes because the alleged failure to
present such proof prior to trial caused Wood no damage.
THE PARTNERSHIP IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER ATTORNEYS1

E.

FEES INCURRED BELOW AND UPON APPEAL.
1.

The Award of Attorneys1 Fees Below Was Proper.

Contrary to Wood's argument, there was in fact
evidence to support the trial court's apportionment of the
fees incurred by the Barnes Children in connection with the
unsuccessful fraud claim and the claims upon which they were
successful.
The parties stipulated below that attorneys' fees
could be proven up by the prevailing party by affidavit after
the decision of the Court was rendered.

In accordance with

that stipulation, counsel submitted an affidavit to the Court
specifying the nature of the services performed for, and the

amount of attorneys1 fees incurred by, the Barnes Children in
connection with the case. Wood objected to the affidavit on
the basis that there was no apportionment of the services
performed in connection with the fraud claim.

Counsel then

filed an supplemental affidavit which stated that virtually no
additional time, effort or expense was incurred in presenting
the fraud claim because the same witnesses, documents,
testimony and argument would have been presented with or
without the fraud claim. [R. 277-279]
One of the contentions made by Wood in this action
was that as of 1980 when the modification agreement was made,
Wood was entitled to an equitable adjustment of the rent based
upon the supposed fact that Wood was allegedly losing several
thousand dollars a year at the Palace store.

The fraud claim

was based upon the fact that in reality Wood was not losing
any money on the store, and that Wood had only created an
artificial loss of a couple of thousand dollars by marking up
the price of the ice cream which Wood sold to himself and by
charging the Palace store with an arbitrary share of the
overhead expenses of Wood's general operation.

The same

evidence which was presented to show that the Palace store had
not in fact lost money was relevant and would have been
introduced to show not only that Wood had committed fraud, but
also to show that no possible equitable claim existed for
adjustment of rent.
Thus, there was in fact evidence presented by the
Barnes Children from which the trial court reasonably

determined its award of attorneys' fees.

The trial court, in

its discretion, did not accept, in total, the evidence
presented by the Barnes Children that no additional time,
expense or effort was involved with respect to the fraud claim
and determined based upon the evidence that one-third of the
time spent by counsel reasonably related to the fraud claim
for which attorneys' fees could not be recovered.

The trial

court, therefore, reduced the amount of attorneys' fees by
one-third and entered Judgment for attorneys' fees in the sum
of $6,566.66.
It is well settled that a trial court has a great
deal of discretion in determining the amount of attorneys'
fees and that in the absence of an abuse of that discretion,
the amount of the attorneys' fees will not be disturbed.
Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management, 645 P.2d 667,
671 (Utah 1982).

The question of what is a reasonable

attorney's fee depends on a number of factors which the trial
court is in an advantaged position to determine.
Build, Inc., 402 P.2d 699 (Utah 1965).

Wallis v.

In making that

determination a trial court may take into consideration not
only what the attorney has billed and the number of hours
spent but the difficulty of the litigation, the efficiency of
the attorneys in presenting the case, the reasonableness of
the number of hours spent on the case, the fee customarily
charged in the locality for similar services, the amount
involved in the case and the result attained, and the

expertise and experience of the attorneys involved.
v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622 (Utah 1985).

Cabrera

The fact that the

trial court did not accept all of the evidence presented on
attorneys1 fees is not important.

The trial court was not

simply limited to accepting or rejecting all of the evidence
on attorneys1 fees, but was entitled to make its own
assessment of the additional fees necessitated by the fraud
claim.
The cases cited by Wood in his attempt to overturn
the award of attorneys1 fees are distinguishable from the case
at bar.
In Nelson v. Newman, 583 P.2d 601 (Utah 1978)
(Wood's Brief p. 51), the Plaintiff had presented absolutely
no evidence as to the amount of fees incurred with respect to
collection of a note as opposed to the fees incurred on a
claim for which fees could not be awarded.

Rather, counsel

testified that he had "no idea" how much time had been spent
in collecting the note.

Further, the trial court did not even

attempt to apportion the fees incurred in connection with
collection of the note, but awarded fees based upon the offer
of judgment provisions of Rule 68(b), U.R.C.P.

This Court

simply determined that it was error for the trial court to
award fees under Rule 68(b) and that because there had been no
evidence presented as to the amount of fees incurred in
collection of the notes, attorneys1 fees had been improperly
awarded.

In contrast, in the present case, counsel did in

fact testify concerning the amount of additional time spent in
connection with prosecution of the fraud claim.

The trial

court simply refused to adopt the Barnes Children's contention
and apportioned the fees based upon its own review of the
evidence.
In Paul Mueller Co. v. Cache Valley Dairy Assoc,
657 P.2d 1279 (Utah 1982), cited by Wood, the trial court had
apportioned the attorneys' fees but had done so based solely
on a post-trial statement of counsel rather than upon the
evidence presented on the issue.

This Court simply held that

the trial court's decision had to be based upon the evidence
and remanded the matter for the limited purpose of determining
either from the evidence already presented or from additional
evidence what a reasonable and equitable apportionment of the
fees should be.
In short, the evidence was sufficient to support
the trial court's award of attorneys' fees.

Further, even if

the evidence was not sufficient, attorneys' fees should not be
denied but the matter should simply be remanded for the
purpose of determining a proper apportionment of the fees.
Paul Mueller Co. v. Cache Valley Dairy Assoc, supra.
2.

The Barnes Children Are Entitled to Recover

Fees Incurred on Appeal.
If the Barnes Children prevail on this Appeal, they
are entitled to an award of attorneys' fees incurred on Appeal
and the case should be remanded for the purpose of determining

the additional amount of attorneys1 fees to be awarded.
Management Services Corp. v. Development Associates/ 617 P.2d
406 (Utah 1980).
CONCLUSION
Wood clearly agreed in the Lease to pay rent
escalations based upon increases in the cost of living and to
pay a percentage of any increases in taxes and the parking lot
lease.

All the trial court did was to reject Wood's repeated

attempts to avoid these obligations and to hold Wood to his
bargain.

Wood's Brief, for the most part, simply seeks to

overturn the Judgment by focusing on what he considers to be
favorable evidence and ignoring the substantial evidence
supporting the Judgment.

Such an attack is unavailing.

It is respectfully submitted that the Judgment should
be affirmed and that the Barnes Children should be awarded
their attorneys' fees and costs incurred on this Appeal.
DATED this

2G?— day of July, 1985.
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